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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

properly had subject matter jurisdiction. Cases requiring exhausting
administrative remedies were overruled.
Further, the trial court's unreasonable impairment definition as
"something more than de minimus," would force defendants to claim
lack of alternatives as a sole affirmative defense. CEPA compliance
instead determines the proper standard. Because minimum flow
statutes were not designed solely to protect fish and wildlife, they were
proper factors in establishing unreasonable impairment, consistent
with CEPA's statutory scheme.
Waterbury further established a prescriptive easement against
Washington. Waterbury's conduct was sufficiently open and visible for
the statutory period to give the Washington notice that flow
diminished by diversions adverse to the Washington's rights. The
easement's scope however, was for the trial court to determine on
remand, with reference to the 1893 and 1921 agreements. The trial
court's remedy was inadequate because it was based on a faulty,
unreasonable impairment definition and denied relief for Waterbury's
contractual breach.
Robert Lykos
Grannis Island Co., Inc. v. City of New Haven, No. CV000445887S,
2002 WL 230912 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2002) (affirming a city
planning commission's denial of a proposed regrade plan because the
petitioner did not support the plan with sufficient evidence and the
plan was inconsistent with the Connecticut Coastal Management Act).
Grannis Island Co. ("Grannis") owned property in New Haven,
bordered by tidal wetlands and property owned by New Haven Land
Trust ("NHLT").
Previously, the New Haven Water Authority
("NHWA") owned the adjacent property where Grannis stored
construction materials. Subsequently, NHWA conveyed their property
to NHLT. Upon acquiring ownership, NHLT requested Grannis
remove the stored materials from their property. Consequently,
Grannis decided to "regrade and fill 4.6 acres of upland on [its]
property" in order to store their construction materials. To attain
permission for the regrade, Grannis applied to the New Haven City
Plan Commission ("Commission") for a coastal site plan review and a
soil and erosion control permit. After a hearing, the Commission
denied Grannis' application. Grannis appealed the application denial
to the Superior Court of Connecticut.
At issue before the court was whether the record supported the
Commission's decision to deny Grannis' application. The court
affirmed the Commission's decision based on the following factors: (1)
there was insufficient evidence regarding the spatial relationship
between the proposed regrade and the tidal wetlands border; (2) the
description of the regrade plan was insufficient; (3) Grannis failed to
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identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the regrade; and (4)
the Commission identified conflicts between the goals of the
Connecticut Coastal Management Act ("CCMA") and the regrade
when discussing open space in relation to Grannis' property.
First, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion there was
insufficient information showing the spatial relationship between the
regrade area and the tidal wetland border. During the Commission's
hearing on Grannis' application, a letter from the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") stated the DEP
could not define the boundary of tidal wetlands on the subject
property. Thus, the court found the DEP letter supported the
Commission's conclusion.
Second, the court discussed the Commission's conclusion that the
project's description was insufficient. While Grannis submitted a letter
showing proposed sediment and erosion controls, it did not show
these measures on the regrade plan nor did Grannis establish where
on the property they would place the measures. Hence, the court
affirmed the Commission's decision that the description was
insufficient.
Third, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion that
Grannis failed to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the
regrade. Specifically, Grannis introduced no evidence of plans to
mitigate the effects of rainwater washing over construction materials
stored on their property.
Consequently, the court upheld the
Commission's conclusion that Grannis failed to mitigate adverse
impacts.
Fourth, the court evaluated whether the Commission based its
denial of Grannis' application on a desire for the property to become
open space.
The Commission initiated a zoning ordinance
amendment process to re-designate open space areas no later than
November 1, 2000, twenty-one days after the Commission denied
Grannis' application. The newly proposed zoning ordinance map
labeled Grannis' property as open space. If the Commission rezoned
Grannis' property to open space, then storage of construction
materials would be a non-conforming use. Further, the Commission
acknowledged open space was consistent with New Haven's "future
land use plan" and the Commission supported the NHLT acquiring
property in the area where Grannis' property was located. While the
court found the evidence could support a conclusion that the
Commission based its denial of Grannis' application on a desire for
the property to become open space, the court found it was more
reasonable the Commission was identifying conflicts between the
regrade and the goals of the CCMA. For the above reasons, the court
found the record supported the Commission's conclusion.
Heather Chamberlain

